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This study examined relations between passage of time judgments and duration
judgments (DJs) in everyday life, in young and elderly people, with an Experience
Sampling Method. The DJs were assessed by verbal estimation and interval production
measures. The results showed no difference between young and elderly people in
judgments of rate of passage of time, a result contrary to the conventional idea that
time passes more quickly as we get older. There were also no significant relation
between the judgment of passage of time and the judgments of durations. In addition,
the significant predictors of individual differences in the judgment of passage of time
(emotion states and focus of attention on the current activity) were not predictors of
judgment of durations. In sum, passages of time judgments are not related to DJs.
Keywords: time, time perception, passage of time, Experience Sampling Methodology, elderly
INTRODUCTION
The main aim of the work reported in this article is to explore relations between passage of
time judgments (PoTJs) and duration judgments (DJs), with the latter being assessed by verbal
estimation and interval production measures. In addition, the present study provides a partial
replication of Droit-Volet and Wearden’s (2015) recent work on a comparison of PoTJs in a
student-age group and a group of elderly people, around 50 years older.
A PoTJ is a judgment about how fast time seems to pass in some situation. It is generally
measured with a question such as “How fast does time pass for you?” or “How did time pass relative
to clock time?”, with responses usually being given on a Likert-type scale with 7 points from “very
slowly” to “very fast” (e.g., Blewett, 1992; Wittmann and Lehnhoff, 2005; Friedman and Janssen,
2010). Studies using this type of question have suggested that subjective experience of passage of
time changes as a function of health status of individuals or contexts (for a review see Droit-Volet,
2013). For example, depressed people experience a slowing down of time passage, such that “time
seems to drag. A day feels like a year” (Ratcliffe, 2012).
Some authors assume that this experience of time passage reflects fundamental changes in
basic mechanisms underlying the representation of duration, for example, in the rate of the
pacemaker of some sort of internal clock (Rammsayer, 1990). According to the popular Scalar
Expectancy Theory, the judgment of durations depends on the number of pulses emitted by a
pacemaker and counted in an accumulator (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984). Consequently, if
there is a slowdown of the internal clock rate in patients suffering from depression, they would
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introspectively feel this change, and would express it in terms
of slowing down of the passage of time. However, as discussed
later, in human beings, the consciousness of time passing faster
or slower than usual cannot be simply dependent on number of
pulses counted during an event. In line with this idea, a significant
number of studies suggested that patients with depression do
not show deficits in their abilities to judge stimulus durations,
even though they experience time passing slowly (for a recent
meta-analysis see Thönes and Oberfeld, 2015).
The principal question addressed here concerns this relation
between PoTJs and judgments of duration. One way of addressing
this issue might be to take concurrent measurements of both
the judgment of durations and the judgment of passage of time
and examine how the two measures covaried. A small number
of studies have examined the relation between the retrospective
judgment of durations (when the people were not alerted in
advance that a question about time would be asked) and the
judgment of the rate of passage of time. When participants
were asked about PoTJs and DJs after an action film or a
relaxation video, Wearden (2005) did not find any relationship
between these two forms of judgment. In fact, people judged that
time was passing more quickly for the action film than for the
relaxation film, while the action film was retrospectively judged
as slightly longer. Likewise, Wearden (2008) obtained PoTJs and
retrospective time judgments of three durations of a film under
two processing conditions. In one of these, the instruction was
simply to watch the film and in the other people were required to
count each time one of the characters had spoken after another
character. The different conditions changed PoTJs, but DJs were
unaffected.
However, the lack of relationship between the DJs and PoTJs in
these studies might be related to the fact that, in the retrospective
timing tasks used, the participant’s attention is not focused on
the processing of time. In addition, the PoTJ and the DJ are
measured from a single time interval, or a few time intervals,
ranging from a few 1 seconds to minutes. Also, the PoTJ of an
event created in laboratory may differ from PoTJs in everyday life
which may involve longer periods of time. Lamotte et al. (2014)
showed that individuals are not aware of most of the factors
that influence their perception of durations in the range from
milliseconds to seconds. They are only aware of fluctuations of
passage of time in two contexts those when, introspectively, they
feel themselves happy or sad and engaged in a daily activity. In a
recent study assessing PoTJs in everyday life with the technique
of Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM), Droit-Volet and
Wearden (2015) found that PoTJs in everyday life changed
with the individuals’ moods and their degree of immersion in
the activity they were currently engaged in. Consequently, we
decided to use the ESM method to examine the relation, if
any, between prospective judgment of durations and the lived
experience of passage of time, when the individuals are aware of
their states of happiness and the intensity of their engagement in
activity.
The ESM method (see Conner et al., 2003) is an ecological
approach that is mainly used in clinical psychology but has been
used in the domain of time psychology in a few studies (Conti,
2001; Larson and von Eye, 2006; Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2015,
and recently Droit-Volet, in press a). Conti (2001) examined the
link between PoTJs and intrinsic or extrinsic work motivation,
and Larson and von Eye (2006) the link between this time
judgment and the degree of engagement in activities. Droit-Volet
and Wearden (2015) studied differences in PoTJs in young and
elderly people. In all these ESM studies, the participants received
“alerts,” at quasi-random times, several times per day (8 or 10).
When an alert is received, the participant’s task is to respond to
a short questionnaire, with the aim being to collect immediate
impressions, rather than those based on reflection. For example,
Droit-Volet and Wearden (2015) assessed PoTJs in young and
elderly people at the time of the alert, as well as the rating of their
emotional states (happiness, sadness, arousal, relaxation), and
their level of occupation (the difficulty of the activity performed
at the time of the alert – Activity difficulty – and the focus of
attention on that activity – Attention capture –).
In the present ESM study, we thus assessed PoTJs, as well as
people’s emotional states and the intensity of their activity, but we
also measured DJs using a verbal estimation task, and an interval
production task. This enabled us not only to relate PoTJs at the
time of the alerts to DJs, but also enabled us to explore potential
predictors of both PoTJs and DJs. In addition, following Droit-
Volet and Wearden (2015) we used two participant groups, one
of young people and the other of elderly persons.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The final sample was composed of 27 participants (18 women
and 9 men): 14 students at University Clermont Auvergne (mean
age = 20.50, SD = 1.99, age range from 18.88 to 22.42) and 13
elderly people (mean age = 69.46, SD = 3.62, age range from
68.01 to 71.42). Three additional individuals (one young and
two elderly adults) participated in the study but stopped the
experiment, so their data were not included in the final sample.
All participants signed a consent form approved by the Sud-
Est VI Statutory Ethics committee, and received 40 euros for
their participation. The Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE)
was administered to elderly people to reject those suffering from
dementia (mean score = 29.54, SD = 0.66). The IQ scores on
the Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III, Grégoire and
Wierzbicki, 2009) were also measured but they did not differ
significantly between the young (M = 98.28, SD = 10.70) and
the older participants (M = 105.69, SD = 11.70), t(25) = −1.72,
p = 0.10. Their depression scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI) test (Beck et al., 1961) were also similar [3.64
vs. 3.23, t(25)= 0.29, p= 0.78].
Apparatus
Motorola G Android Jelly Bean smartphones were used for this
experiment with data collection programs specifically written
by the CATech (http://lapsco.univ-bpclermont.fr/catech) of the
Laboratory of Social and Cognitive Psychology of the University
Clermont Auvergne. The programs delivered and recorded all
experimental events (alerts, questions and temporal tasks). The
participants responded by pressing on the touch screen of the
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smartphone. The stimulus used in the verbal estimation and the
temporal production task was a sound (La, 440 hz).
Procedure
Participants initially received an explanation of the procedure of
the experiment and the functioning of the smartphone (with one
demonstration), then filled in the different scales (MMSE; WAIS-
III, BDI). They then kept their smartphone for five consecutive
weekdays, from Monday to Friday. They received eight alerts
per day, from 8.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m., with one alert randomly
delivered within each 90-min period, with at least 15 min between
any two alerts. This made a total of 40 alerts per participants.
After each alert, the participant performed the verbal
estimation task and the production task followed by their PoTJ.
For the verbal estimation task, the participant was required to
judge (using a scale ranging between 100 and 2000 ms) three
different durations, each randomly chosen between (1) 350 and
650 ms, (2) 850 and 1150 ms, and (3) 1350 and 1650 ms,
respectively. The presentation order of these three durations was
random. For the production task, the participants were initially
presented with a duration value: 500, 1000, or 1500 ms. A blue
circle then appeared and the participants were required to press
on the circle to trigger a sound, then release the pressure, thus
stopping the sound, when they judged that the sound duration
equalled the value indicated. The duration presentation order was
also random. For all temporal tasks, the participant initiated a
trial by touching the screen after the word “ready,’ and this was
followed after 500 ms by the events of the trial. Furthermore, the
participant did not receive feedback regarding their performance
on the verbal estimations and time productions.
After the temporal tasks had been performed, the question “At
the moment, the moment of the alert, how does time pass for you
compared to the time of the clock” was given. The participant
responded on a 7-point scale: “(1) much slower – (2) moderately
slower – (3) a little slower – (4) at the same rate than the clock
– (5) a little faster – (6) moderately faster – (7) much faster.”
Following this PoTJ question, they responded to affective and
activity questions. There were four affective questions: “At the
moment of the alert, do you feel (1) happy” (Happiness), (2) “sad”
(Sadness), “excited/stimulated” (Arousal) and “relaxed/calm”
(Relaxation). The activity questions concerned the difficulty of
the activity performed at the moment of the alert (Activity
difficulty) and whether it captured the participants’ attention
(Attention capture). For these different questions, participants
responded on 7-point scale from “not at all” to a “lot.”
RESULTS
For the ESM phase of our study, the overall average percentage of
missed alerts for the 40 alerts (8 alerts × 5 days) was 5 (M = 5,
SD = 5.50) (min = 0, max = 20%) with no difference between
the young and elderly participants on average [4.82 vs. 5.19,
t(25) = 0.17, p = 0.87]. Consequently, nobody was excluded on
the basis of their ESM scores. The responses for the different
variables at the times of the alerts were analyzed by multi-level
modeling, using SPSS. The multi-level modeling procedure is a
variant of regression, which generates an estimate (coefficient)
indicating whether the outcome variable and its predictor are
positively related (with a positive coefficient) or negatively related
(with a negative coefficient). The coefficient essentially represents
how much the outcome variable changes for an unit change
in the predictor. The significance of the relation between the
variables is indicated by the significance of the predictor, assessed
by a t-value. However, the values of the coefficients are not
meaningful when the predictor variables are arbitrarily encoded,
as for our between-group analysis. It is also important to recall
that multi-level modeling is a type of repeated-measures design,
and so is generally considered more powerful than a simple
between-groups design (Bolger et al., 2012), especially when
many observations per participant are collected for each variable
measured (e.g., usually 40 in our study). Calculation of statistical
power for multi-level designs is not, however, straightforward
and disagreement exists as to the best method (Bolger et al., 2012;
see also Nezlek, 2012).
Table 1 shows means and standard errors of scores on the
different variables tested in our study for the young and older
groups. The t-values indicated the between-group differences
on these variables. There were no significant between-group
differences for the verbal estimates (all p > 0.05). A significant
between-group difference was only observed for the temporal
production of the shortest duration of 500-ms (p = 0.02). As
shown in Figure 1, durations produced were shorter for the
elderly group than for the young people when they had to
produce the target duration of 500 ms. The between-group
difference did not reach significance for two longer target
durations. Additional analyses were performed with the day and
the time of alert introduced into the model. These analyses
showed no variation either in the verbal estimates or the
durations produced with the time of the alert [verbal estimates:
500-ms, t(73.89) = 0.41; 1000-ms, t(65.45) = 0.53; 1500-ms,
t(68.04) = 1.04; Production: 500-ms, t(34.24) = 1.16; 1000-ms,
t(36.71) = 0.38; 1500-ms, t(36.41) = 0.37, all p > 0.05]. There
was nevertheless a significant link between day and the verbal
estimates for all stimulus durations [500-ms, t(130.47) = −4.10;
1000-ms, t(102.10) = −4.96; 1500-ms, t(78.49) = −3.82, all
p = 0.0001], and the production of the different target durations
[500-ms, t(35.45) = 3.16; 1000-ms, t(37.91) = 4.80; 1500-ms,
t(35.60) = 4.96, all p < 0.001]. When we used a composite
measure for the verbal estimates (mean of estimates for the three
stimulus durations), the difference in verbal estimates reached
significance between the first (1298.51) and the three last days
(1078.77, 1025.11, and 996.25, respectively), and the second
(1178.40) and two last days (Bonferroni, p < 0.05), with no
difference between the two first days (p > 0.05). That is, the
length of verbal estimates decreased over days. Conversely, for
the temporal productions, the values of reproduced durations
increased from the first to the third days (Bonferroni, p < 0.05)
after which the time produced no longer changed (p > 0.05).
There was no significant difference between the young
and elderly people in the judgment of the rate of passage
of time (p > 0.05). Additional analyses also obtained no
significant differences on this measure with respect to the day
[t(34.69) = 0.90, p = 0.38] and the alert time [t(33.08) = −0.17,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 176
fpsyg-07-00176 February 19, 2016 Time: 11:44 # 4
Droit-Volet and Wearden Passage of Time Judgments and Duration Judgments
TABLE 1 | Means and standard errors of measures of duration judgments
from the verbal estimation and production tasks, scores on the passage of








Young 589.58 55.76 0.51 0.62
Older 548.88 57.83
1000-ms verbal estimation
Young 1135.64 77.29 0.25 0.80
Older 1107.46 80.17
1500-ms verbal estimation
Young 1646.10 89.90 0.14 0.89
Older 1627.75 93.25
500-ms production
Young 573.60 45.68 2.58 0.02
Older 403.94 47.39
1000-ms production
Young 898.63 58.77 1.72 0.10
Older 753.11 60.98
1500-ms production
Young 1171.38 79.34 1.17 0.25
Older 1044.27 82.33
Passage of time judgment
Young 4.75 0.20 0.90 0.38
Older 4.49 0.20
Happiness
Young 4.78 0.17 0.95 0.35
Older 5.01 0.18
Sadness
Young 2.29 0.27 0.11 0.91
Older 2.25 0.28
Arousal
Young 4.32 0.24 0.91 0.37
Old 4.01 0.25
Relaxation
Young 3.38 0.27 0.31 0.76
Older 3.50 0.28
Activity difficulty
Young 3.06 0.28 1.55 0.13
Older 2.44 0.29
Attention capture
Young 4.69 0.22 2.44 0.02
Older 3.92 0.23
Data are shown separately for the young and older groups.
p = 0.87]. Responses were also similar in the two groups for
emotion-related questions and the difficulty of activity performed
at the time of the alert (p > 0.05). The extent to which the activity
at the time of the alert captured the participant’s attention was
however, significantly lower for the old than the younger group
(p= 0.02).
We next analyzed some potential predictors of PoTJs (shown
in Table 2). First, we used two composite measures of DJs.
These were the mean of verbal estimates for the three stimulus
durations, and the mean time produced for the three target
FIGURE 1 | Mean verbal estimates (upper) and mean time produced
(bottom) plotted against stimulus duration in young and elderly people.
durations. The mean time produced for the 500-ms duration
was also included, as there was a significance difference between
the young and the older group. In neither participant group was
either measure of timing predictive of PoTJs. In other words, the
verbal estimation and the production of durations did not vary
with the experience of time passage at the moment of the alert
(all p > 0.05).
In contrast to the dissociation between PoTJs and measures
of DJs, many variables measured at the time of the alert
were predictive of PoTJs. Positive affect was significantly
positively related to PoTJs for both the young and older
groups (p < 0.05). Indeed, for both young and elderly people,
the passage of time was judged to go faster when happiness
increased. Similarly, negative affect was significantly negatively
related to PoTJs in both groups such that the time was
judged to pass slower when the state of sadness increased.
Reported arousal was also positively related to PoTJs and
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Young 0.00004 [–0.0005,0.001] 0.0002 0.20 0.85
Older −0.0001 [–0.0006,0.0004] 0.0002 −0.46 0.68
Production
Young 0.0002 [–0.0005,0.0009] 0.0004 0.61 0.55
Older −0.00001 [–0.0004,0.0004] 0.0002 −0.05 0.96
500-ms production
Young 0.0002 [–0.0007,0.001] 0.0005 0.52 0.60
Older −0.0002 [–0.0007,0.0004] 0.0003 −0.68 0.50
Happiness
Young 0.28 [0.17,0.39] 0.06 5.06 0.0001
Older 0.12 [–0.007,0.23] 0.06 1.94 0.05
Sadness
Young −0.23 [–0.35,−0.11] 0.06 −4.16 0.001
Older −0.13 [–0.22,−0.04] 0.05 −2.93 0.004
Arousal
Young 0.21 [0.10,0.32] 0.05 3.97 0.0001
Older 0.02 [–0.08,0.13] 0.05 0.44 0.66
Relaxation
Young −0.19 [–0.27,−0.11] 0.04 −4.92 0.0001
Older −0.003 [–0.09,0.085] 0.04 −0.08 0.94
Activity difficulty
Young −0.04 [–0.16,0.08] 0.06 −0.67 0.52
Older 0.07 [–0.007,0.15] 0.04 1.96 0.07
Attention capture
Young 0.10 [0.02,0.18] 0.04 2.49 0.02
Older 0.08 [0.006,0.16] 0.04 2.28 0.03
The predictor is shown along with its associated coefficient value [confidence
interval], t- and p-value. The timing measure predictors are shown with higher
precision than the others as with 2 decimal places they would all be rounded to
zero. Data are shown separately for the young and older group.
reported relaxation negatively related, but only for the young
group. There was no significant effect of this arousal variable
in the older participants. In addition, the extent to which
the activity captured attention at the moment of the alert
was positively and significantly related to PoTJs for both the
young and the older groups, while no significance was found
for the judgment of the difficulty of the activity for both
groups.
We next used the variables listed in Table 2 from happiness
to attention capture to try predict verbal estimates (Table 3)
and the times produced (Table 4) for the young and older
participants taken separately. This made a total of 24 analyses
(six predictors × two timing measures × two groups). Of these
24, only one was significant at 0.05, and this was the “attention
capture” for the younger group, such that the more their attention
was focused on the activity that they performed at the time
of the alert, the shorter their temporal estimates. As indicated
Table 3, there is obviously a significant relationship between
verbal estimates and time produced: the longer estimates in the
verbal estimation task, the shorter the time produced in the
temporal production task.









Young −0.64 [–0.81,−0.47] 0.08 −7.73 0.0001
Older −0.63 [–0.84,−0.43] 0.10 −6.18 0.0001
Happiness
Young −1.99 [–0.27,0.23] 13.17 −0.15 0.88
Older −54.11 [–116,8.24] 31.56 −1.71 0.09
Sadness
Young −7.05 [–33.05,18] 13.24 −0.53 0.59
Older −13.42 [–21,33] 30.69 −0.44 0.67
Arousal
Young 6.04 [–21,33] 12.46 0.49 0.64
Older −21.70 [–64,21] 21.84 −0.99 0.32
Relaxation
Young 0.11 [–18,18] 9.46 0.01 0.99
Older −26.81 [–66,12] 20.01 −1.34 0.18
Activity difficulty
Young 1.37 [–13,16] 7.50 0.18 0.85
Older 26.88 [–17,70] 21.41 1.26 0.22
Attention capture
Young −16.20 [–32,−0.13] 7.68 −2.11 0.05
Older 21.37 [–16,59] 18.91 1.13 0.26
For each group, the predictor is shown along with its associated coefficient value
[confidence interval], t- and p-value.
DISCUSSION
The results of our study replicated those found by Droit-Volet
and Wearden (2015) by demonstrating that PoTJs did not
significantly differ between young and elderly people, a result
contrary to the conventional idea that time passes more quickly
as we get older. Our results confirmed that the experience of time
passage in the everyday life did not fluctuate with age but, rather,
with the individual’s emotion states. When the participants felt
happy, they reported higher rate of time passage. Conversely,
when they felt sad, time seemed to drag. In addition, our results
suggested that the young and older individuals experienced
an acceleration of time passage with the increase in the focus
of attention on the current activity. Droit-Volet and Wearden
(2015) only found this result for young people, possibly related
to the great variability in activities performed by elderly people
compared to young people who were all students. However, we
found a positive relation between PoTJ and attention capture
by the activity performed at the moment of the alert, whereas
Droit-Volet and Wearden (2015) found a negative relation. The
translation of effect of attention capture by the activity in terms
of passage of time thus seems more inconsistent in individuals
than emotional effects. Nevertheless, whatever orientation in
the speed of time passage (speeding up or slowing down), our
study, like that conducted by Droit-Volet and Wearden (2015)
and by Droit-Volet (in press a) in participants older than 75
years demonstrated that emotion and attention are the two main
factors at the origin of fluctuations of subjective experience of
time passage.
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Young −0.54 [–17,15] 7.67 −0.07 0.94
Older 34.47 [–4,73] 18.29 1.88 0.08
Sadness
Young −2.72 [–25,19] 10.02 −0.27 0.79
Older 0.63 [–37,38] 17.48 0.04 0.97
Arousal
Young 6.24 [–8,21] 6.79 0.92 0.38
Older 16.76 [–5,39] 10.33 1.62 0.13
Relaxation
Young −2.75 [–18,13] 6.55 −0.42 0.69
Older −3.83 [–29,22] 11.99 −0.32 0.76
Activity difficulty
Young 2.48 [–5,10] 4.17 0.60 0.55
Older 4.04 [–9,18] 7.12 0.57 0.57
Attention capture
Young 9.22 [–2,20] 5.30 1.73 0.11
Older −11.42 [–28,5] 8.10 −1.41 0.18
For each group, the predictor is shown along with its associated coefficient value
[confidence interval], t- and p-value.
The original contribution of the present study is that it also
tested judgment of durations at the same time as the participants
reported their experience of time passage. The results found
no significant relation, or any relation approaching significance,
between these two forms of time judgment. Neither the verbal
estimates nor the times produced in the temporal production task
covaried significantly with the PoTJs. It seems therefore that the
subjective feeling that time passes more quickly or slowly than the
normal rate of external clocks does not depend on the number
of pulses accumulated by a potential internal clock that might
provide the raw material for the representation of durations.
The duration perceived can change with the acceleration of
the internal clock mechanism (for a review see Droit-Volet
et al., 2013), without people feeling that time passes more
quickly. Conversely, participants may feel that the time passes
more quickly without modification in the rhythm of internal
mechanism which forms the basis of the perception of duration.
This is entirely consistent with the studies on patients with
depression which have shown that they express a slowing down of
time passage, although they do not exhibit any deficit in the time
perception compared to healthy people (Thönes and Oberfeld,
2015), as well as data from the few earlier studies which collected
PoTJs and restrospective DJs from the same experiment (e.g.,
Wearden, 2005, 2008).
Our study using ESM therefore shows dissociation between
the judgments of durations and the judgments of passage of time.
This dissociation clearly appears in our findings showing that
the factors that predicted the individual differences in PoTJ were
not significant predictors of judgments of durations both for the
verbal estimation and the reproduction task. Indeed, in contrast
to the PoTJs, judgments of durations did not vary with the state
of happiness or sadness felt at the moment of the alert. Only the
factor related to attention paid to the current activity affected
these two different forms of time judgment. However, the relation
was in the opposite direction for the two types of judgment:
the speed of passage of time increased with increasing attention
capture while the verbal estimated decreased. Consequently, our
results on the prospective time judgments confirmed those found
with retrospective time judgments that suggested no evidence
that PoTJs and DJs are related (Wearden, 2005, 2008; Wearden
et al., 2014).
Other studies need to be conducted before we can definitely
confirm the absence of a link between PoTJs and judgments
of durations. However, the lack of relation between these two
forms of judgment supports the idea that in human beings there
are several different types of time judgments. The first one is a
judgment of durations common to human beings and to other
animals that involves a basic cerebral system functioning as an
internal clock. A second is a judgment of passage of time specific
to human beings. What determines the subjective experience of
a speeding up or a slowing down of the flow of time is still not
known for certain, with only a small amount of research to date
(e.g., see Flaherty, 1993; Larson, 2004; Larson and von Eye, 2006;
Lamotte et al., 2014; Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2015; Wearden,
2015; Droit-Volet, in press a). However, phenomenologists (e.g.,
Husserl, 1964; Minkowski, 1968/1988) have considered for many
years that the judgment of time passage results from individuals’
introspection on their internal life, a “time of self ” compared
to a “time of world” (Minkowski, 1968/1988) (for a review see
Droit-Volet, in press b). The challenge is to scientifically examine
this form of time judgment and its impact, if any, on other
types of time judgment. Our study provides an initial response
to this difficult question: concluding that there is no direct
link.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Conceived and designed the experiments: SD-V and JW.
Performed the experiments: SD-V Analyzed the data: SD-V and
JW. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: SDV. Wrote
the paper: SD-V and JW.
FUNDING
This work was supported by a grant (TIMESTORM) from
European Commission, Horizon 2010 research and innovation
action (H2020-FETPROACT-2014).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the members (Mickael Berthon, Pierre Chausse, and
Julien Guegan) of the CATech (http://lapsco.univ-bpclermont.f
r/catech) of the Laboratory of Social and Cognitive Psychology
(Blaise Pascal University), and more particularly Mickael Berthon
who programmed the smartphones used for the ESM study. We
also thank Romain Lacaux who collected the data as part of his
Master’s degree.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 176
fpsyg-07-00176 February 19, 2016 Time: 11:44 # 7
Droit-Volet and Wearden Passage of Time Judgments and Duration Judgments
REFERENCES
Beck, A. T., Ward, C., and Mendelson, M. (1961). Beck depression inventory (BDI).
Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 4, 561–571.
Blewett, A. E. (1992). Abnormal subjective time experience in depression. Br. J.
Psychiatry 161, 195–200.
Bolger, N., Stadler, G., and Laurenceau, J.-P. (2012). “Power analysis for intensive
longitudinal studies,” in Handbook of Research Methods for Studying Daily
Life, eds M. R. Mehl, and T. S. Conner (New York, NY: Guilford Press),
285–301.
Conner, C. T., Barrett, F. L., Bliss-Moreau, E., Lebo, K., and Kaschub, C. (2003).
A practical guide to experience-sampling procedures. J. Happin. Stud. 4, 53–78.
Conti, R. (2001). Time flies: investigating the connection between intrinsic
motivation and the passage of time. J. Pers. 69, 1–26.
Droit-Volet, S. (2013). Time perception, emotions and mood disorders. J. Physiol.
Paris 107, 255–264.
Droit-Volet, S. (in press a). Time does not fly but slow down in old age. Time Soc.
Droit-Volet, S. (in press b). “Temporalités, Emotion, Humeur, et troubles
de l’humeur,” in De l’humeur Quotidienne à la Dépression Sévère: Manuel
Pluridisciplinaire de la Thymie, eds E. Laurent and P. Vandel (Éditions De
Boeck-Solal).
Droit-Volet, S., Fayolle, S., Lamotte, M., and Gil, S. (2013). Time, emotion and the
embodiment of timing. Timing Time Percept. 1, 1–30.
Droit-Volet, S., and Wearden, J. H. (2015). Experience sampling methodology
reveals similarities in the passage of time between young and elderly adults. Acta
Psychol. 156, 77–82.
Flaherty, M. G. (1993). Conceptualizing variation in the experience of time. Sociol.
Inquiry 63, 394–405.
Friedman, W. J., and Janssen, S. M. J. (2010). Aging and the speed of time. Acta
Psychol. 134, 130–141.
Gibbon, J. (1977). Scalar expectancy theory and Weber’s law in animal timing.
Psychol. Rev. 84, 279–325.
Gibbon, J., Church, R. M., and Meck, W. (1984). “Scalar timing in memory,” in
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 423: Timing and Time Perception,
eds J. Gibbon and L. Allan (New York, NY: New York Academy of Sciences),
52–77.
Grégoire, J., and Wierzbicki, C. (2009). Comparaison de quatre formes abrégées
de l’échelle d’intelligence de Wechsler pour adultes. Rev. Eur. Psychol. Appl. 59,
17–24.
Husserl, E. (1964). Leçons Pour une Phenomenology de la Conscience Intime du
Temps. Paris: Presse Universitaire de France.
Lamotte, M., Chakroun, N., Droit-Volet, S., and Izaute, M. (2014). Metacognitive
questionnaire on time: feeling of passage of time. Timing Time Percept. 2,
339–359.
Larson, E. (2004). The time of our lives: the experience of temporality in
occupation. Can. J. Occup. Ther. 1, 22–32.
Larson, E., and von Eye, A. (2006). Predicting the perceived flow of time from
qualities of activity and depth of engagement. Ecol. Psychol. 18, 113–130.
Minkowski, E. (1968/1988). Le Temps Vécu. Brionne: Imago Mundi.
Nezlek, J. B. (2012). “Multilevel modelling analyses of diary-style data,” in
Handbook of Research Methods for Studying Daily Life, eds M. R. Mehl, and T. S.
Conner (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 357–383.
Rammsayer, T. H. (1990). Temporal discrimination in schizophrenic and affective
disorders: evidence for a dopamine-dependent internal clock. Int. J. Neurosci.
53, 111–120.
Ratcliffe, M. (2012). Varieties of temporal experience in depression. J. Med. Philos.
37, 114–138.
Thönes, S., and Oberfeld, D. (2015). Time perception in depression: a meta-
analysis. J. Affect. Disord. 175, 359–372.
Wearden, J. H. (2005). “The wrong tree: time perception and time experience in
the elderly,” in Measuring the Mind: Speed, Age, and Control, eds J. Duncan, L.
Phillips, and P. McLeod (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 137–158.
Wearden, J. H. (2008). The perception of time: basic research and some potential
links to the study of language. Lang. Learn. 58(Suppl. 1), 149–171.
Wearden, J. H. (2015). Passage of time judgments. Conscious. Cogn.
Wearden, J. H., O’Donoghue, A., Ogden, R., and Montgomery, C. (2014).
“Subjective duration in the laboratory and the world outside,” in Subjective
Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality, eds V.
Arstila, and D. Lloyd (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 287–306.
Wittmann, M., and Lehnhoff, S. (2005). Age effects in the perception of time.
Psychol. Rep. 97, 921–935.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Droit-Volet and Wearden. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 176
